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Abstract: 
The 2004 Presidential Election in Mozambique was marred by allegations of 
fraud.  We assess the validity of these allegations by testing whether or not 
qualitative descriptions of the methods and locations of misconduct are 
consistent with a series of simple quantitative tests.  Most studies of electoral 
misconduct are based on ecological regression analysis or on comparing a 
different data set with the electoral data in question – past elections, exit polls, 
etc. In the case of Mozambique this is impossible due to data restrictions. 
Instead we use qualitative evidence to inform a quantitative identification 
strategy.  The concordance between specific complaints and the statistical 
evidence suggests that ballot box stuffing, improper ballot nullification, and 
(intentional) organisational failure took place. While the overall election result 
was unaffected by the fraud, our analysis demonstrates a method of assessing 
allegations of misconduct and points to areas of concern for those managing or 
observing future elections in Mozambique and elsewhere.   
 
 
 
Introduction 
Mozambique’s 2004 presidential elections were heavily criticised by international observers 
and the independent press and were challenged by Renamo,2 the main opposition party. At the 
time of the election, evidence was published of ballot box stuffing, attempts to prevent 
opposition voters from casting their ballots, and invalidating opposition ballot papers during 
                                                 
1 Joseph Hanlon is a senior lecturer in development and conflict resolution at the Open University, Milton Keynes, England. 
He is the editor of the Mozambique Political Process Bulletin. j.hanlon@open.ac.uk.  Sean Fox is a PhD Student Fellow at 
the Crisis States Research Centre at the London School of Economics. We would like to thank James Putzel, Jean-Paul 
Faguet, Jouni Kuha, Francisco Gutierrez, Jason Sumich and João Honwana for useful comments and guidance. 
2 Both main parties are now officially known by their acronyms. The ruling party Frelimo was Frente de 
Libertação de Moçambique, Mozambique Liberation Front. The main opposition party Renamo was first 
Movimento Nacional de Resistência de Moçambique (National Resistance Movement of Mozambique, MNR) 
and later Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambican National Resistance).  
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the counting process. Because of the size of the landslide victory by the ruling party, Frelimo, 
it was not suggested that misconduct and maladministration changed the outcome. The 
Renamo complaint was therefore rejected by the Constitutional Council (CC, Conselho 
Constitucional), and observer criticisms (MOE-EU 2004; Carter Center 2004) were not 
followed up by the international community. The CC is the supreme constitutional court but it 
also validates elections and is the final court of appeal for election complaints. 
 
In its ruling accepting the election, the CC was nonetheless highly critical of the National 
Elections Commission (CNE, Comissão Nacional de Eleições), which it said violated the law 
in various ways. As international observers had also done, the CC condemned the CNE’s 
secrecy and was especially critical of the CNE’s failure to investigate and prosecute apparent 
violations of the electoral law. This creates the image that election law violations go 
unpunished. “If violations of the election law remain unpunished, they will multiply and 
threaten the entire fundamental principals of our state. This is a real threat”, the Council said. 
(CC 2005). 
 
The CNE rejected the Council’s criticisms and took no action. Its spokesman said that if the 
Council had wanted actions, it would have rejected the election results submitted by the CNE; 
since it did not, nothing need be done (MPPB 32, p7, 2005). Frelimo has never formally 
responded to the CC declaration, nor to allegations of fraud. 
 
The publication in August 2006 of detailed data on the elections  allows a close scrutiny of 
the results (STAE 2006).  The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the data allows us 
to confirm or refute allegations of fraud and misconduct. Most other studies of electoral 
misconduct employ ecological regression analysis, or rely on comparing a different data set 
with the electoral data in question – past elections, exit polls, etc. In the case of Mozambique 
this is impossible; similar data was not published for the previous election in 1999, there are 
no exit polls, and there are no reliable opinion polls. This paper is unusual, therefore, in taking 
advantage of qualitative information concerning the alleged methods and locations of 
misconduct to create a quantitative identification strategy.  As we note below, it is sometimes 
possible to identify quite blatant irregularities without statistical inference. Here, however, we 
use simple statistical techniques in an attempt to identify the existence and extent of less 
obvious fraud and misconduct.   
 
 
The electoral process and the election 
 
Since the adoption of a new constitution in 1990 establishing a multiparty system and the end 
of the war of destabilisation in 1992, there have been five multiparty elections in Mozambique 
– for national parliament and president in 1994, 1999 and 2004, and for mayors and municipal 
assemblies in 1998 and 2003.  
 
In 2004 Mozambique had a population of 19 million, of whom 9.1 million were of voting age 
– 18 years old or older. The country is divided into 11 provinces. The president is elected by a 
majority vote in nation-wide direct elections. Parliament is elected on a party list system, with 
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a separate list for each province. In 2004, for the first time, Mozambicans outside the 
country were allowed to vote. 
 
There have been slightly different laws for each of the five elections but the system has 
remained largely constant. There is an electoral commission (CNE) dominated by nominees 
of the political parties and a Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration (STAE, 
Secretariado Técnico de Administração Eleitoral), which is largely professional but with some 
party appointees. This structure is replicated at provincial level and, below that, at district 
level. The Frelimo party has been in power since independence in 1975 and has won all five 
elections; the "partyisation" of the electoral structures has been promoted by the opposition, 
Renamo, but Frelimo’s electoral victories mean that it necessarily dominates. 
 
Voters are required to register and receive an electoral card with their photograph and there 
was a new registration for the 1999 election, with updates in 2003 and 2004. Each register 
book is hand-written and has space for up to one thousand names. There is a separate polling 
station corresponding to each register book and voters can only cast their ballot at the polling 
station where they are registered. Under normal circumstances, the polling station is in the 
same place where the registration took place and wherever possible this is in a school. Thus, 
in a typical school, each classroom will contain a polling station with its own register book. 
Each group of polling stations (such as a school) is known as a polling centre. 
 
Each polling station operates autonomously and has a staff of five people, known as the mesa 
(table). Each party can nominate two delegates (poll watchers) who may remain in the polling 
station at all times. In 2004, polling took place over two days and on the night between the 
two polling days, ballot boxes were sealed with numbered ties and locked in a secure place if 
possible (such as the school store room). Members of the mesa and party delegates slept with 
the ballot boxes over night. As soon as voting closed at 6 pm on the second day, each polling 
station began its own count. The law and regulations specify quite precisely how this is to be 
done and the full count normally takes 6-10 hours. When the count is completed, a results 
sheet (edital) is completed and copies are given to party delegates. A copy is immediately 
posted on the polling station door, making the result public immediately. Copies of the results 
sheets are sent to the provincial and national election commissions. The Provincial Election 
Commission then compiles and announces results. 
 
Voters can put either an ‘X’ or a fingerprint on the ballot paper next to the name, picture and 
party symbol. A vote is considered valid if the intention of the voter is clear and invalid if 
there are marks indicating more than one candidate. All invalid ballot papers (as well as any 
that are challenged by the party delegates) are sent to the capital to be reconsidered by the 
CNE. This is a massive job. In 2004 there were 130,997 presidential ballot papers ruled 
invalid by polling stations and sent to the CNE, which then accepted 33% of them as valid, 
and 158,770 invalid parliamentary ballots of which the CNE judged 31% to be valid.  
 
The CNE compiled results from the individual editais (polling station results sheets), then 
added in the re-qualified votes and announced the final national result. The immediate posting 
of the results allows parallel counts and thus in 2004 there were two parallel counts. One was 
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done by the national Radio Moçambique, whose reporters went to polling centres all over 
the country and simply read out the results posted on the polling station doors. By mid-day of 
the day after the election, the extent of the Frelimo landslide was obvious. The second count 
was a sample count of every 17th polling station done by a coalition of national non-
government organisations known as the Electoral Observatory. Its forecast was very close to 
the final results. A third check was provided because the National Election Commission set 
up computer terminals for press and observers and they could access the data base of editais 
(results sheets) as data was entered. This led quickly to articles being distributed by the 
national news agency, AIM, and to a daily electronic edition of the MPPB highlighting 
suspiciously high and low turnouts. 
 
Table 1 gives the results of the presidential elections in all three elections. In the first two, 
Joaquim Chissano was the Frelimo candidate and in the third it was Armando Guebuza. 
Afonso Dhlakama was the candidate for Renamo in all three elections. There were 
independent candidates in the 1994 and 2004 elections, but not in 1999. Note that the 1999 
election was very close. The collapse of the vote for Dhlakama in 2004 was largely 
unexpected and has been subject to much analysis (MPPB 2004; Sitoe 2006). 
 
 
Table 1.  Votes (in millions) 
 
Election 
Year 
Chissano/ 
Guebuza Dhlakama Others Total 
1992 2.6 1.7 0.6 4.9 
1999 2.3 2.1  4.5 
2004 2.0 1.0 0.1 3.1 
 
 
Problems 
 
The election was dogged by problems caused by poor conditions, sloppy administration, 
excessive secrecy, and apparent sabotage. In the first group are problems caused by 
Mozambique being one of the poorest countries in the world.  Mozambique still does not have 
universal primary education, so there are more polling stations than classrooms. Many are in 
temporary structures constructed for the purpose and many are in areas with very difficult 
access. Most classrooms and temporary polling stations do not have electricity. This means 
that the count is done at night, by lamplight, by a mesa whose members are very tired after 
little sleep the previous night. This in turn leads to many errors on the results sheets. 
 
International and national observers repeatedly criticised STAE and CNE for their very high 
level of secrecy. For example, a full list of polling stations was never published nor was there 
a list linking register books to polling stations. In confirming the election results, the 
Constitutional Council said that 699 presidential editais (results sheets) were not included, for 
such reasons as “editais not processed because of irresolvable technical errors, editais stolen, 
and those covered in indelible ink” (CC 2004).  This represented 5.4% of polling stations but 
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Mozambique’s electoral law has no provision for recounts. The technical errors are typical 
of tired staff in the small hours of the morning making mistakes in counting or writing up the 
results sheets. Stealing editais and pouring ink on them was clearly a form of sabotage. The 
law allowed the CNE to refer to copies of editais given to party delegates but this was not 
done. All decisions on the exclusion of editais were taken in secret and never explained; no 
spoiled editais were even shown to press or observers. Former US President Jimmy Carter, in 
a personal statement at a press conference to announce preliminary results of the Carter 
Center’s observation, said that the exclusion of so many polling stations was “extraordinary. 
It is simply hard to believe that so many results sheets could not be used” (MPPB 31, p2, 
2004). Carter also criticised the secrecy of the Mozambican process and the exclusion of 
observers from key parts of the counting. 
 
In fact, as Table 2 shows, the published results exclude 881 polling stations, or 6.9% of the 
total. No explanation was ever given for the difference in the numbers; no list of excluded 
polling stations has even been published; and no reasons have been given for the exclusion of 
polling stations. 
 
Table 2. Polling stations not included in the final result 
 
Province Polling Stations 
Editais 
not 
counted 
% Not 
counted 
Cabo Delgado 1391 326 23% 
Niassa 725 82 11% 
Gaza 993 108 11% 
Zambézia 2370 207 9% 
Africa 62 4 6% 
Maputo Prov. 752 32 4% 
Tete 919 38 4% 
Sofala 1039 25 2% 
Nampula 2282 48 2% 
Maputo City 762 5 1% 
Manica 723 4 1% 
Inhambane 786 2 0% 
Europe 3 0 0% 
TOTAL 12,807 881 7% 
  
6
 
 
 
 
Register books and turnout 
 
There were also serious problems with the electoral registers. Most had been computerised, 
but there were many mistakes – names left out, misspelled names, and incorrect voter 
numbers. Moreover, it was never clear how many people were on the electoral role. There 
were more than 10 million names on the books (and turnouts are based on the number of 
names in the register books) but STAE estimated that there were only 9.1 million new 
registrations. Since this is also the estimated number of voting age adults, it is clearly too high. 
Taking into account deaths and other corrections, the Mozambique Political Process Bulletin 
(MPPB), edited by one of the authors of this paper (JH), estimated the real number of live, 
registered voters at 7.6 million (MPPB 31, p 14, 2004). 
 
Turnout – the percentage of people on the register who actually vote – is a key issue in this 
paper. Register book numbers include the year of registration and on average it was predicted 
that more than 10% of the voters in 1999 register books would have died by the time of the 
2004 elections, whilst many others would have moved away. By contrast, the turnout for the 
2003 and 2004 registers would be much higher because not only would fewer people have 
died and moved, but those books contained many people who had become 18 years old and 
were voting for the first time, and thus were more likely to vote. This turned out to be the case. 
Nationally, the turnout (as a percentage of the 10 million) was 33%, but for voters in the 1999 
books it was only 28%, while for those in 2003 and 2004 books it was 47% - significantly 
higher. 
 
Allegations of fraud 
 
Allegations of fraud and misconduct came from opposition parties, most notably Renamo, and 
from observers and the media (mainly AIM and MPPB, which both followed the election 
closely and transmitted daily reports). An overriding complaint by Renamo was that its 
delegates had been barred from some polling stations, either by force or by being denied 
credentials, and this prevented them making detailed complaints about some of the worse 
violations (GCE 2004). 
 
Renamo, the MPPB, and observers, all identified three kinds of misconduct and these will be 
tested in this paper. 
 
• Ballot Box Stuffing. Either putting extra ballot papers in the box or simply writing higher 
numbers on the results sheets. Renamo claimed this was particularly serious in Tete, Gaza and 
Niassa, usually where delegates had been excluded by polling stations and thus no one was 
able to watch the counting. Media and observers noted an unusual number of polling stations, 
particularly in Tete, with suspiciously high turnouts and with nearly everyone voting for 
Guebuza and Frelimo. Since turnout from the 1999 register books was much lower and more 
than 10% of the voters in the 1999 register books would have died by the time of the 2004 
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elections, any result sheet from a 1999 book with a turnout of over 90% is immediately 
suspect. In this study, we will look for abnormally high turnout rates. 
 
• Improper Spoiling of Ballot Papers. Renamo alleged that many votes for Dhlakama were 
simply not counted at the polling stations by Frelimo-aligned members of polling station staff. 
(GCE 2004; GPE 2004). Most commonly, in the poor light late at night during the count, 
Dhlakama votes were simply called invalid (nulo) when they were not, or valid votes were put 
into piles or sacks of invalid votes. More dramatically, it was alleged that polling station staff 
put ink fingerprints on votes for Dhlakama, so that the ballots had multiple marks and became 
invalid (nulo). During the reconsideration of nulos by the CNE, one of the authors of this 
paper (JH) did indeed see a stack of ballot papers that had apparently been invalidated with a 
fingerprint in the same position on each ballot paper. In Angoche, Renamo actually caught a 
mesa president in the act and filed a formal complaint (ibid) but no action was taken. As 
Table 3 shows, 33% of all nulos were accepted by the CNE and as table 4 shows, a 
disproportionate share of these were votes for Dhlakama. Indeed, Dhlakama obtained 15,129 
re-qualified votes more than he would have received if the ratio had been the same as for 
votes in general. This is at least consistent with the Renamo allegation that thousands of valid 
votes for Dhlakama were put into the wrong piles and treated as invalid during the counting at 
polling stations. In this study, we look for abnormally high rates of nulos. 
 
• (Intentional) Organisational Failure Meaning Some Voters Unable to Vote. The 
election took place at the start of the rainy season, which made access to some polling stations 
very difficult; many opened late (sometimes only on the second day) because of late arrival of 
materials, and the CNE reported that 37 polling stations never opened. However, Renamo 
claimed that many polling stations only opened very late on the second day. Renamo also 
cited register books that were sent to the wrong polling stations and complained that some 
polling stations were moved without voters being informed so that many voters were unable 
to vote (ibid). Members of the mesa, the police, and journalists are the only people allowed to 
vote where they are not registered and thus in any polling station where six or less people 
voted, it seems likely that only staff voted. AIM and the MPPB identified some polling 
stations with a turnout of 6 or less. An important question is: “Did voters in Renamo- 
supporting areas have more trouble voting that those in Frelimo areas?” In this study, we look 
for abnormally low turnout rates. 
 
Table 3. Nulos and re-qualified votes, by province 
 
Province Votes in ballot box 
Nulos at 
polling 
station 
level 
% nulos 
Nulos re-
qualified 
by the 
CNE 
% of nulos 
re-
qualified 
Cidade Maputo 261,706 4,854 1.9% 1,152 23.7% 
 Cabo Delgado 302,974 11,804 3.9% 6,356 53.8% 
 Gaza 330,639 8,604 2.6% 1,925 22.4% 
 Inhambane 182,025 7,037 3.9% 1,838 26.1% 
 Manica 206,455 7,543 3.7% 2,298 30.5% 
 Maputo 216,171 6,272 2.9% 1,328 21.2% 
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 Nampula 493,333 23,699 4.8% 8,405 35.5% 
 Niassa 149,649 6,889 4.6% 2,290 33.2% 
 Sofala 308,960 11,542 3.7% 3,896 33.8% 
 Tete 371,667 19,034 5.1% 3,727 19.6% 
 Zambézia 477,718 23,293 4.9% 9,368 40.2% 
África 27,138 417 1.5% 99 23.7% 
Europa 732 9 1.2% 0 0.0% 
TOTALS 3,329,167 130,997 3.9% 42,682 32.6% 
 
 
Table 4. Re-qualified nulos, 2004, by candidate 
 
 Guebuza Dhlakama G/D 
Votes given in polling stations 1,990,612 976,256  
Ratio G/D   2.04 
Re-qualified by CNE 13,614 21,803  
Ration G/D of re-qualified   0.62 
 
The quantitative data 
 
In August 2006, STAE published detailed results of the 2004 election on a CD-rom in both 
PDF and Excel formats  (STAE 2004).  For the presidential election, data is included for 
11,926 out of 12,807 polling stations. For each polling station, the following information is 
given: province, district, administrative post, locality, polling centre, register book number 
(which includes the registration year: 1999, 2003 or 2004), number of registered voters, votes 
for each of the five candidates, total valid votes (sum of the previous five), blank votes, 
invalid votes (nulos), and votes in the ballot box (which should be the sum of valid, blank and 
invalid votes). The data is organised by district and we merged the data into a single national 
Excel table. 
 
One district was included twice and this was removed. In addition, we did not consider the 
polling stations outside Mozambique. We also excluded 8 polling stations where the turnout 
percentage was above 120%.  The exclusion of these outliers is based on the assumption that 
these figures (as high as 350%) are the consequence of an initial coding error. This could bias 
our results toward underestimating the degree of fraud. This leaves us with 11,857 polling 
stations. 
 
From this we have further calculated the percentage of votes for each of the two major 
candidates (number of votes cast for each candidate divided by the number of valid votes); the 
turnout rate (the total number of votes cast divided by the number of registered voters at each 
polling station); and the percentage invalid votes for each polling station (the number of nulos 
divided by the total number of votes cast). The three minor candidates combined received 
approximately 5% of the vote, so we exclude them from the analysis. 
 
Reviewing the data (i.e. non-statistical tests) 
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A cursory review of the electoral data reveals some dramatic irregularities and several cases 
of suspicious inconsistencies. For example, a possible case of ballot box stuffing comes from 
primary school EP1 Chicualacuala B in Gaza. The school had two polling stations side by 
side and had the 1999 registers. About 10% of people on a 1999 register are expected to have 
died and many others will have moved away. Yet one of the two polling stations had a 
remarkable 99% turnout with no votes for anyone except Guebuza, while the other had a 57% 
turnout and included a handful of votes for Dhlakama. This raises suspicions of ballot box 
stuffing in the first polling station. In all, there were 140 polling stations with turnouts over 
95% and a further 54 polling stations with 1999 register books and a turnout of between 85% 
and 95%. Of the 194, 114 were in Tete. The most serious problems appear to have been in the 
districts of Changara, Tsangano, Mogoe and Chifunde in Tete, and Chicualacuala and Bilene 
in Gaza – nearly all places where Renamo complained of delegates being excluded.  
 
Similarly, a likely example of improperly counting votes as invalid can be seen by comparing 
neighbouring polling stations in Nauela in Alto Molócuè, Zambézia. Two neighbouring 
polling stations, 02D988-99 and 02D989-99, both had 1,000 registered voters and an almost 
identical turnout (42% and 41%). Both had 63 votes for Guebuza. But the first had 135 votes 
for Dhlakama and 212 spoiled ballot papers, while the neighbouring station had 318 votes for 
Dhlakama and 11 spoiled ballot papers. It looks suspiciously like votes for Dhlakama were 
invalidated in the first of these two polling stations. Throughout the country there were 93 
polling stations with nulos over 25% and a further 160 polling stations with nulos between 
15% and 25%.  
 
Renamo made a number of complaints about polling stations opening very late, register books 
being sent to the wrong polling station and sometimes never transferred to the right one, and 
of polling stations that had been moved so people did not know where to vote. Observers also 
noted these problems. Officially, only 37 polling stations failed to open, but the results show 
another 69 polling stations where 6 or fewer people voted. The law specifies that only people 
on the electoral register may vote, plus members of the mesa (polling station staff, 5 
members), police, and journalists. Thus when only six people vote, we can assume that only 
people not on the register voted, and therefore there was no register or the wrong register. We 
find another 176 polling stations where the turnout was 7-25 (inclusive), which suggests that 
most voters were unable to cast their ballots. In all, 241 polling stations had turnouts of less 
than 4%, and a further 396 polling stations had turn-outs of more than 4% but less than 8%.  
These very low turnout rates may be a consequence of administrative failures, such as those 
described above. While these observations are provocative, they do not prove that misconduct 
was widespread.  To assess the scale of misconduct we now turn to a more systematic 
statistical analysis.  
 
Statistical analysis 
 
Our statistical analysis attempts to determine the extent to which observed turnout and ballot 
nullification rates deviate from expected rates and if deviations exist, whether they are biased 
in favour on one of the parties. The first challenge in designing an identification strategy for 
our statistical tests is establishing what “expected” turnout rates and ballot nullification rates 
  
10
 
are in Mozambique, so that we can compare actual rates in areas where allegations of 
misconduct were made with the expected rates.  In the absence of a comparison set of data 
(such as data from a previous election or exit polling data), or data which could be used for an 
ecological regression analysis (see Powell [1989] and Baum [1991]), we divide the sample 
into a control group and a series of “treatment” groups based on the volume of official 
complaints filed and allegations published in the press at the district and provincial levels – a 
strategy similar to that used by Oberst and Weilages (1990) in their study of the 1982 
referendum in Sri Lanka.   
 
The provinces with the largest volume of official complaints were Nampula, Niassa, Tete and 
Zambezia (GCE 2004).  There were also a sizable number of complaints made in Cabo 
Delgado, Gaza and Manica (ibid).  Cabo Delgado, as we noted, had nearly a quarter of polling 
stations excluded in the count. On the other hand, very few allegations of fraud were made in 
Inhambane, and no complaints were registered in Maputo Province, Maputo City and Sofala. 
We therefore use the 3,272 polling stations in Inhambane, Maputo Province, Maputo City and 
Sofala as our control group.  However, if electoral misconduct occurred, it is possible that it 
affected all provinces and hence our control group may be tainted.  If so, our identification 
strategy would tend to underestimate the degree of fraud. 
 
For the treatment groups, we focus first on the five provinces where the highest number of 
official complaints were filed and published allegations made, and second on particular 
districts within three of these provinces where specific formal complaints were made.  These 
are meant to be representative and certainly do not reflect the extent of the allegations or 
formally filed complaints.  However, we feel that robust evidence from a subset of cases 
should suffice to either confirm or cast doubt on general allegations of fraud.   
 
The treatment provinces include Gaza, Nampula, Niassa, Tete and Zambezia.  In Nampula, 
Niassa and Zambezia multiple complaints were filed concerning improper ballot nullification 
and organisational failure, allegedly leading to very low turnout, while in Tete the primary 
allegations revolved around ballot box stuffing; there were also allegations of ballot box 
stuffing in some districts of Niassa and Gaza. 
 
Subsequently, we look at five districts – Angoche and Murrupula (in Nampula), Changara and 
Tsangano (in Tete), and Milange (in Zambezia). In Angoche, allegations were made of 
improper invalidation of ballot papers.  In Murrupula and Milange, there were reports of 
many polling stations failing to open and in the two districts in Tete, the claim was of ballot 
box stuffing.  
 
Table 5 shows the presidential election results for these five districts in 1999 and in 2004. In 
1999, four of the districts were pro-Renamo areas, while Frelimo won the fifth, Changara. 
The changes in 2004 are worth noting. In Angoche, only Dhlakama’s vote fell (in keeping 
with the national pattern, it was halved). In Murrupula the vote for both sides fell, but the 
balance shifted to Frelimo. In Milange, the vote was only one-third of the 1999 levels, but 
remained predominantly Renamo.  In Changara and Tsangano, Tete, the turnout increased 
substantially (against the national trend). In Changara the vote for Dhlakama was only 10% of 
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what it had been in 1999, while in Tsangano the vote for Frelimo increased 6-fold while the 
vote for Dhlakama decreased significantly.  
 
Table 5. Votes in the five districts to be tested 
 
 1999 2004 
 Chissano Dhaklama C/D Guebuza Dhaklama G/D 
Angoche 27,707 43,429 0.64 28,239 21,212 1.33 
Murrupula 10,151 14,337 0.71 6,919 5,898 1.17 
Milange 11,966 86,886 0.14 7,181 29,471 0.24 
Changara 25,878 9,065 2.85 55,480 940 59.02 
Tsangano 5,343 19,095 0.28 33,928 5,892 5.76 
 
 
Comparison of turnout rates 
 
We begin by comparing the mean turnout rates in our control group and treatment areas. 
Table 6 presents summary statistics for turnout rates at the provincial level and for our control 
group.  Figure 1 presents a frequency histogram of turnout for our control group; Figure 2 
presents histograms of turnout distribution by province.  A cursory inspection of these tables 
and diagrams raises suspicions in particular areas.  In Table 1 (and Figure 1), we see that the 
lowest turnout rates in the country occurred in Nampula, with 26.62% turnout, and Zambezia, 
with 27.17% turnout. Tete is the highest with 52.60% turnout.  These numbers appear to be 
significant deviations from the norm (represented at the bottom of the tables as “Control 
Group”), and correspond with the allegations made and complaints filed in these provinces.  
But are these statistically significant deviations?   
 
Table 7 presents the results of our comparison of means tests.3  Our null hypothesis is that 
average voter turnout in each of the non-control provinces is the same as that of the control 
group.  We present results for both treatment and non-treatment provinces in order to 
ascertain whether or not the treatment provinces (where the most complaints were filed and 
allegations made) are any further from the mean of our control group than the other provinces.  
We take a strict 99% significance level for rejecting the null hypothesis in order to err on the 
side of underestimating the degree of fraud. 
 
 
Table 6.  Turnout Rate by Province 
Province N Mean Std. Dev. 
Cabo Delgado 1065 37.25 18.22 
Cidade de Maputo 757 40.19 14.25 
                                                 
3 All tests were conducted with variances not assumed to be equal. 
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Gaza 883 51.19 21.81 
Inhambane 784 30.22 17.49 
Manica 719 38.52 17.81 
Maputo (Province) 718 37.51 15.43 
Nampula 2233 26.62 14.47 
Niassa 643 33.13 21.06 
Sofala 1013 38.32 18.58 
Tete 879 52.60 24.90 
Zambezia 2161 27.17 16.00 
Control Group 3272 36.64 17.12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 - Turnout Distribution for Control Group 
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Figure 2 - Turnout Distribution by Province 
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Table 7. Comparison of Means for Turnout – Non-Control Provinces vs. Control Group 
Province Mean Difference 
Std. Error of 
Difference T-test P-value 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Nampula 10.02 0.48 21.05 <.001 (9.08; 10.95) 
Niassa 3.50 0.88 3.97 <.001 (1.77; 5.24) 
Tete -15.97 0.89 -17.91 <.001 (-17.72; -14.22) 
Zambezia 9.46 0.46 20.75 <.001 (8.57; 10.36) 
Gaza -14.56 0.79 -18.37 <.001 (-16.11; -13.00) 
Cabo Delgado -0.62 0.63 -.98 0.33 (-1.86; 0.62) 
Manica -1.88 0.73 -2.59 0.01 (-3.32; -0.45) 
  
The P-values indicate that the high turnout rates of Tete and Gaza and the low turnout rates of 
Nampula, Niassa and Zambezia are statistically significant deviations from our assumed 
normal mean (i.e. we reject the null hypothesis in these cases).  The turnout rate for Cabo 
Delgado is not significantly different than that of the control group and Manica falls exactly 
on the 99% level of significance, which suggests that the turnout rate may have been higher 
than average. 
 
Next we consider turnout at the district level.  Table 8 summarises the descriptive statistics for 
turnout for our five treatment districts; Figure 3 illustrates the frequency distributions for 
turnout.  While the turnout ratio for Angoche is very close to the control group mean, the two 
districts in Tete (where allegations of ballot box stuffing were greatest) show significantly 
higher turnout rates and the districts of Milange and Murrupula (where allegations of 
organisational incompetence were made) appear significantly lower than the control group 
mean.   
 
The results of a means test for these districts (Table 9) confirm what is apparent from the 
summary statistics: the high turnout rates for the districts in Tete are statistically significantly 
different from the control group mean, and the low turnout rates in Nampula and Milange are 
also statistically significant.  However, the difference is not significant in the case of Angoche. 
 
Accusations of ballot box stuffing in Tete and Gaza cannot be confirmed by these results, 
however they are consistent with our expectations if such misconduct took place. The low 
turnout rate in Nampula is significant at the provincial level – consistent with allegations that 
organisational failure prevented people from voting there – although it appears that the 
problem was not consistent across districts.  Zambezia also displays suspiciously low turnout 
rates at the provincial and district level.  While the low turnout in Niassa is statistically 
significant, the difference in means is relatively small compared to the other treatment 
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provinces, which corresponds to Renamo complaints concerning a failure to deliver the 
correct register books to a large number of polling stations in only two of the 16 districts in 
the province (GCE 2004). 
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Table 8. Turnout Rates for Treatment Districts 
 
Group N Mean Std. Dev. 
Angoche (Nampula) 189 35.90 19.82 
Murrupula (Nampula) 80 25.02 20.33 
Changara (Tete) 82 88.40 15.73 
Tsangano (Tete) 70 73.84 19.93 
Milange (Zambezia) 229 23.95 16.58 
Control Group 3272 36.64 17.12 
 
 
Figure 3 - Turnout Distribution for Treatment Districts 
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Table 9. Comparison of Means for Turnout – Treatment Districts vs. Control Group 
District Mean Difference 
Std. Error 
of 
Difference 
T-test P-value 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Angoche (Nampula) 0.74 1.47 0.50 .616 (-2.13; 3.64) 
Murrupula (Nampula)  11.62 2.29 5.07 <.001 (7.06; 16.18) 
Changara (Tete) -51.76 1.76 -29.37 <.001 (-55.26; -48.26) 
Tsangano (Tete) -37.21 2.40 -15.50 <.001 (-41.99; -32.42) 
Milange (Zambezia) 12.69 1.14 11.17 <.001 (10.45; 14.93) 
 
Next, we turn our attention of the issue of improper ballot nullification.   Table 10 shows that 
the highest percentage of null votes occurred in our treatment provinces.  This accords with 
our expectations if improper ballot nullification took place.  But are these apparent deviations 
from the norm statistically significant?  Table 11 presents our results from the comparison of 
means tests.  The null hypothesis that there is no difference between the treatment groups and 
the control group in the average percentage of nullified ballots can be soundly rejected.   
 
The results indicate that Tete, Zambezia and Nampula deviated furthest from the control 
group mean.  Again, although the difference is significant in the case of Niassa, it appears to 
have been the least affected treatment province.  Cabo Delgado may have been marginally 
affected, but there is no evidence that suspicious levels of ballot nullification took place in 
Gaza or Manica provinces.   
 
Table 12 summarises the descriptive statistics for null ballot percentage for our five treatment 
districts. Note that Tsangano district in Tete had the highest percentage of null ballots, while 
Changara district (also in Tete) had a below average null ballot percentage. This may reflect 
the fact that Changara was pro-Frelimo in 1999 but Tsangano was pro-Renamo. 
 
The result of the means test is presented in Table 13.   We find that the higher-than-average 
percentages of null ballots in Angoche, Tsangano and Milange are statistically significant.  
Given our strict standards for rejecting the null hypothesis (99% significance level) that there 
is no difference in means, we do not reject the null hypothesis in the case of Murrupula.  
While the lower than average rate of null ballots in Changara is statistically significant, the 
absolute difference is small (between .34 and 1.40%), and of course provides no evidence of 
improper ballot nullification.     
     
So far we have shown that in areas where allegations of misconduct were made, there were 
statistically significant deviations from the expected turnout rates and ballot nullification rates, 
consistent with the allegations.  We now approach the data from a different angle. 
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Table 10. Null Ballots (%) by Province 
Province N Mean Std. Dev. 
Cabo Delgado 1065 3.76 3.45 
Cidade de Maputo 757 1.92 1.20 
Gaza 883 2.63 1.71 
Inhambane 784 3.95 2.49 
Manica 719 3.53 5.59 
Maputo (Province) 718 2.94 1.95 
Nampula 2233 4.43 3.77 
Niassa 643 4.33 6.45 
Sofala 1013 3.75 5.38 
Tete 879 5.44 7.33 
Zambezia 2161 4.73 4.40 
Control Group 3272 3.20 3.50 
 
 
 
 
Table 11. Comparison of Means for Null Ballots - Non-Control Provinces vs. Control Group 
Province Mean Difference 
Std. Error of 
Difference T-test P-value 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Nampula -1.23 0.10 -12.24 <.001 (-1.43; -1.03) 
Niassa -1.14 0.26 -4.37 <.001 (-1.65; -0.63) 
Tete -2.24 0.26 -8.79 <.001 (-2.74; -1.74) 
Zambezia -1.55 0.11 -13.60 <.001 (-1.76; -1.31) 
Gaza 0.56 0.08 6.72 <.001 (0.40; 0.73) 
Cabo Delgado -0.57 0.12 -4.63 <.001 (-0.81; -0.33) 
Manica -0.34 0.22 -1.54 0.124 (-0.76; 0.09) 
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Table 12. Null Ballots (%) for Treatment Districts 
Group N Mean Std. Dev. 
Angoche (Nampula) 189 4.71 4.46 
Murrupula (Nampula) 80 3.91 2.62 
Changara (Tete) 82 2.33 2.34 
Tsangano (Tete) 70 9.04 9.25 
Milange (Zambezia) 229 5.87 6.01 
Control Group 3272 3.20 3.50 
 
 
 
Table 13. Comparison of Means for Null Ballots - Treatment Districts vs. Control Group 
District Mean Difference 
Std. Error 
of 
Difference 
T-test P-value 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Angoche (Nampula) -1.51 0.33 -4.57 <. 001 (-2.16; -0.86) 
Murrupula (Nampula)  -0.72 0.30 -2.41 .018 (-1.32; -0.13) 
Changara (Tete) 0.87 0.27 3.27 .002 (0.34; 1.40) 
Tsangano (Tete) -5.84 1.11 -5.28 <.001 (-8.05; -3.63) 
Milange (Zambezia) -2.67 0.40 -6.37 <.001 (-3.46; -1.88) 
 
 
Regression analysis 
 
We employ regression analysis to determine whether there is a significant correlation between 
party support and irregularities at the polling station level – a result that would further lend 
credence to allegations of systematic misconduct.  We set up two simple models to answer 
two questions concerning party support and irregularities: 1) is there a correlation between 
party support (as expressed by the number of voters at each polling station that voted for a 
particular candidate) and voter turnout rates?; and 2) is there a correlation between party 
support and the percentage of nullified ballots at each polling station? 
 
The allegations of fraud were directly linked to party support. First, Renamo alleged that its 
delegates were excluded in areas where Frelimo was strongest.  If this were true, we would 
expect to find evidence of ballot box stuffing in Frelimo strongholds. Second, it was claimed 
that attempts were made to prevent Renamo supporters from voting.  If this were true, we 
would expect to find unusually low turnout in areas where Renamo was strongest. 
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We begin the analysis at the national level.  Regression 1 (Table 14) shows the results of a 
model that estimates voter turnout based on the number of votes cast and the percentage of 
voters that voted for each of the main candidates.  Holding the number of votes cast constant, 
we find that the percentage of voters that voted for the Frelimo candidate has a positive and 
significant effect on voter turnout.  Conversely, the percentage of voters that voted for the 
opposition (Renamo) candidate is negatively and significantly correlated with turnout.  These 
results are robust to the inclusion of provincial dummy variables, which control for potential 
systematic differences at the provincial level, such as urbanisation or literacy rates. 4  
Interpreting the significance of this apparent relationship is complicated by the fact that the 
party support variable is an expression of votes cast, not ex ante voter intention.  It is 
reasonable to suppose that Frelimo’s landslide victory was due to a more ambitious 
constituent base than that of the opposition, or that Renamo voters were not motivated enough 
to vote.  In other words, the direction of causality may run from turnout to party support, 
rendering the model inconclusive.  We deal with this issue in the second stage of our analysis 
below.  At this point we can only conclude that the results are in line with our expectations if 
fraud took place. 
 
Table 14. Regression 1: National Level Turnout 
Regression 1 
Dependent Variable = Turnout % 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Votes Cast 
 
0.095 
(120.39) 
  
 
0.094 
(117.33) 
 
0.094 
(118.23) 
% Guebuza  
 
0.141 
(21.71) 
 
 
0.053 
(11.76) 
 
% Dhlakama   
 
-0.124 
(-18.31) 
 
 
-0.047 
(-10.21) 
 
 
Observations 11857 11855 11855 11855 11855 
R-Squared .55 .038 .028 .56 .55 
 
Regression 2 presents the results of a simple model in which the percentage of nullified 
ballots is the dependent variable and party support is the independent variable.  The results 
indicate a negative and significant correlation between expressed support for the Frelimo 
candidate (Guebuza) and the percentage of nullified ballots; conversely the model indicates a 
positive and significant correlation between support for the opposition candidate (Dhlakama) 
and the percentage of nullified ballots.   
                                                 
4 In most cases the provincial dummy variables were significant, suggesting that there were indeed systematic 
differences across regions affecting turnout rates.  However, we do not report them here in order to maintain 
simplicity in the models, and because they did not affect the significance of the results. 
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Table 15. Regression 2: National Level Null Ballot % 
Regression 2 
Dependent Variable = Percentage of “Nulos” in Ballot Box 
 (1) (2) 
% Guebuza 
 
-0.028 
(-19.81) 
 
% Dhlakama  
 
0.026 
(17.66) 
 
 
Observations 11855 11855 
R-Squared .032 .026 
 
These results are more clearly suspicious.  It is possible that there is a systematic difference in 
the ability of individuals to properly fill out a ballot that falls along party lines, such as 
literacy (Renamo voters tend to be less educated).  However, these results are also robust to 
the inclusion of provincial dummy variables, which ought to catch such effects. We suspect 
that the difference is due to improper ballot nullification at polling stations where Renamo 
support was considered a threat to a Frelimo victory. 
 
The next stage of analysis focuses on the control group sample.  If there were unobservable 
factors affecting voter turnout or ballot nullification that happen to fall along party lines, there 
should be no appreciable difference in results from the national and control group samples.  
Regressions 3 and 4 repeat the models used above, this time drawing just on the control group 
sample.       
 
Table 16.  Regression 3: Control Group Turnout 
Regression 3 
Dependent Variable = Control Group Turnout % 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Votes Cast 
 
0.092 
(56.66) 
  
 
0.092 
(56.56) 
 
0.092 
(56.43) 
% Guebuza  
 
-0.042 
(-4.22) 
 
 
-0.025 
(-3.46) 
 
% Dhlakama   
 
0.052 
(5.11) 
 
 
0.026 
(3.61) 
 
Observations 3272 3272 3272 3272 3272 
R-Squared .50 .005 .008 .50 .50 
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Table 17.  Regression 4: Control Group Null Ballot % 
Regression 4 
Dependent Variable = Control Group Percentage of “Nulos” in Ballot Box 
 (1) (2) 
% Guebuza 
 
-0.013 
(-6.38) 
 
% Dhlakama  
 
0.011 
(5.32) 
 
 
Observations 3272 3272 
R-Squared .012 .009 
 
The explanatory power of both models (R-squared statistic) falls to inconsequential levels, 
indicating that party support is not robustly affecting turnout rates or null ballot rates in the 
control group provinces.  Interestingly, the coefficients on the party support variables switch 
places.  Now it is support for the opposition candidate that is positively correlated with 
turnout.  It may be the case that Renamo voters rallied in the control group provinces (three 
are predominately Frelimo and one Renamo), or that Frelimo voters became lazy, or that the 
model is poorly specified.  Whatever the explanation, it is clear from the reversal of signs and 
insignificant explanatory power of the model that the correlations between party support and 
turnout observed at the national level are being driven by the provinces where allegations of 
fraud were greatest (i.e. the provinces excluded from the control group).  
 
The results from Regression 4, which assess the correlation between party support and 
nullified ballots within the control group provinces, are more in line with the national-level 
results, although the fit of the model is again reduced to insignificance.  This further suggests 
that the treatment provinces are driving the trends observed at the national level. In order to 
verify this, we repeat the models again in Regressions 5 and 6, this time using just polling 
stations from our treatment provinces (Nampula, Niassa, Tete, Zambezia and Gaza). Given 
our results thus far, we are not surprised to find that expressed support for the Frelimo 
candidate is positively and significantly correlated with turnout, and negatively and 
significantly correlated with the percentage of ballots nullified at the polling station level.  
Indeed, the fit of the models dramatically improves for this comparison group. 
 
The scatter plots in Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the difference in the correlation between turnout 
and party support in the control group and treatment group samples.  The break in the data at 
the 85% level of support for Guebuza is a graphic representation of the suspicious nature of 
the correlation.  Huddled in the upper right hand corner of the graph is a host of polling 
stations where turnout levels were significantly higher than the national average and where 
support for Guebuza was nearly universal. Although voting preferences are often segregated 
territorially (Schelling 1971), the difference between the two groups does raise suspicions that 
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the high level of turnout and support for Guebuza in some treatment group polling stations 
was a consequence of misconduct. 
Finally, we re-run the models for Tete province, which received the greatest number of formal 
complaints, and which so far has statistically deviated from the control group most severely 
(Tables 20 and 21).  Once again we find that party support is highly significantly correlated 
with voter turnout and the percentage of nullified ballots, and once again we find that the fit 
of the model improves dramatically over the previous set of regressions. 
 
Table 18.  Regression 5: Treatment Group Turnout 
Regression 5 
Dependent Variable = Comparison Group Turnout % 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Votes Cast 
 
0.100 
(106.57) 
  
 
0.095 
(93.93) 
 
0.096 
(95.39) 
% Guebuza  
 
0.266 
(27.68) 
 
 
0.103 
(16.18) 
 
% Dhlakama   
 
-0.247 
(-25.20) 
 
 
-0.096 
(-14.49) 
 
 
Observations 6801 6799 6799 6799 6799 
R-Squared .60 .11 .085 .61 .61 
 
 
 
Table 19.  Regression 6: Treatment Group Null Ballot % 
Regression 6 
Dependent Variable = Comparison Group Percentage of “Nulos” in Ballot Box 
 (1) (2) 
% Guebuza 
 
-0.034 
(-16.42) 
 
% Dhlakama  
 
0.033 
(14.94) 
 
 
Observations 6799 6799 
R-Squared .038 .032 
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Table 10.  Regression 7: Tete Province Turnout 
 
Regression 7 
Dependent Variable = Tete Province Turnout % 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Votes Cast 
 
0.082 
(30.31) 
  
 
0.068 
(23.56) 
 
0.070 
(24.34) 
% Guebuza  
 
0.499 
(18.59) 
 
 
0.236 
(9.92) 
 
% Dhlakama   
 
-0.501 
(-17.19) 
 
 
-0.229 
(-9.10) 
 
 
Observations 879 879 879 879 879 
R-Squared .51 .28 .25 .56 .55 
 
 
Table 11.  Regression 8: Tete Province Null Ballot % 
Regression 8 
Dependent Variable = Tete Province Percentage of “Nulos” in Ballot Box 
 (1) (2) 
% Guebueza 
 
-0.048 
(-5.24) 
 
% Dhlakama  
 
0.045 
(4.61) 
 
 
Observations 879 879 
R-Squared .030 .024 
 
In sum, the regression analysis indicates a systematic relationship between party support and 
the irregularities that we would expect to find if fraud were indeed committed.  In the control 
group of four provinces where few complaints were made, there are no significant 
correlations, yet in the treatment group we see exactly what we would expect if there were 
misconduct – a correlation between high turnout and support for Frelimo (implying ballot box 
stuffing), a correlation between low turnout and Renamo support (suggesting organisational 
failure), and a correlation between high levels of nullified ballots and Renamo support. The 
fact that the results are significant at the national level emphasises the scale of the problem, 
  
25
 
and the analysis shows that these irregularities occurred in precisely the provinces that were 
the subject of Renamo complaints. 
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Figure 5. Treatment Group Scatterplot of Frelimo Support and Turnout 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Control Group Scatter Plot of Frelimo Support and Turnout 
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Conclusion 
 
It is important to reiterate that all of the statistical evidence presented above does not “prove” 
that misconduct took place.  However, all of the results are consistent with the specific 
allegations of fraud that were made.  The accumulated evidence suggests that fraud did take 
place, and that it was significant. 
 
We started with complaints of misconduct by the main opposition party and by international 
observers. By examining the data, we then identified hundreds of polling stations which did 
indeed correspond to the complaints and where there seemed to have been ballot box stuffing 
(benefiting Frelimo) on the one hand and improper ballot nullification and organisational 
failure which made it hard for people to vote (harming Renamo) on the other. 
 
The next step was to use statistical methods to see if the problem was widespread, rather than 
simply in isolated polling stations.  The strength of the analysis, and our conclusion, lies in 
our identification strategy, which has sought to corroborate specific allegations made in 
specific locations and which has consistently made conservative assumptions in order to err 
on the side of underestimating the scale of irregularities.  The evidence presented favours the 
conclusion that ballot box stuffing, improper ballot nullification and organisational failure did 
indeed take place on a large scale.  Furthermore, we conclude that fraud was most prevalent in 
those provinces where Renamo complained about misconduct.  
 
While the overall election result was unaffected by the fraud, our analysis offers a simple 
strategy for assessing allegations of misconduct and points to areas of concern for those 
managing or observing future elections in Mozambique and elsewhere.   
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